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Monetary Policy in the Pacific Basin
The importance ofthe Asia"Pacific Basin in the
world economy has grown enormously over the
past three decades. Over this period, average
output growth in this region has consistently sur"'
passed that of any other region in the world.
Moreover, in recent years, the rapid growth and
transformation of the financial systems of the
Asia-Pacific nations have made this region an ex-
citing arena for observing financial reform and
deregulation. Since the mid-1970s, almost all
countries in the region have undertaken steps to
reform and liberalize their domestic financial
systems and to remove restrictions on inter-
national capital flows.
Financial market development, liberalization,
and reform have posed new challenges to the
central banks of Pacific Basin nations. Policy-
makers have responded by changing their
conduct of monetary policy. To analyze these
developments, compare experiences, and draw
policy implications, the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco sponsored a major conference last
Fall drawing together central bank officials from
the Pacific Basin region, academics, and other
scholars. The papers prepared for that conference
were recently published in a volume entitled
Monetary Policy in Pacific Basin Countries. This
Letter provides an overview of the implications of
the financial market transformations for the con-
duct of monetary policy in the region based on
the findings of the studies presented at the
conference.
Restrictive environment
During the 1970s, the degree of financial market
development and sophistication varied widely
among countries in the Pacific Basin. Cor-
respondingly, the degree of financial market
restrictiveness and the conduct of monetary pol-
icy varied as well. Some nations, notably the
United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore, had
relatively free and well~developed financial mar-
kets. At the other end of the spectrum were
countries with heavily regulated financial sys-
tems, such as Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, and
China.
InspiteoLthisdiversity, nearly all the financial
systems in the Pacific Basin were subject to reg-
ulatory and legal restrictions on financial activity.
In most countries, these restrictions included in-
terest rate regulations, credit allocation controls,
explicit and implicit taxes on financial institu-
tions, and/or international capital controls. Such
measures were designed to affect private saving-
investment flows through their influence on the
flow of credit and to finance government expen-
ditures by extracting seigniorage through money
creation and regulation of the financial sector.
Policymakers sought to control the flow of loan-
able funds from savers to investors because they
wanted to ensure the flow of funds to certain
sectors of the economy and, they felt, the normal
financial intermediation process could not guar-
antee the socially optimal allocation of credit.
Consequently, interest rate regulations on both
deposit and loan rates were used as instruments
of monetary policy. Likewise, credit controls
were imposed to encourage lending to priority
sectors, including the government. These con-
trols ranged from quantitative restrictions on
lending by various types of financial institutions
to measures that encouraged lending to certain
sectors through central bank rediscounting of
credits to those sectors at subsidized rates. Fi-
nally, controls on both inflows and outflows of
international capital prevented financial institu-
tions from evading domestic financial controls by
undertaking transactions in external markets.
Winds of change
Since the mid-1970s, a variety of forces have
been at work to force changes in the financial
markets of countries in the Pacific Basin. Infla-
tionary monetary policies in the mid-1970s,
coupled with regulated deposit rates that yielded
negative real returns, drove private savings from
regulated banks. Then, in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, monetary authorities' attempts to
bring inflation under control put further pressure
on interest rates and accelerated this process of
financial disintermediation. In time, such disin-
termediation led to the growth of nonbank finan-FRBSF
cial institutions and markets outside the regu-
lated sector, thereby reducing the effectiveness of
the existing apparatus of monetary control.
At the same time, policymakers in most Pacific
Basin countries came to recognize that financial
restrictions hindered economic growth. Ceilings
on interest rates,by depressihgfealinterest
yields in high inflation environments, worked to
reduce incentives to accumulate domestic finan-
cial assets. Domestic investment was conse-
quently dampened. Credit controls also allocated
credit inefficiently by emphasizing financing for
government deficits and capital-intensive pro-
jects of large firms to the detriment of smaller
firms, which were denied access to organized
financial markets.
External macroeconomic developments and
competitive pressures from abroad also made it
more difficult to maintain tightly regulated finan-
cial systems and created another motivation for
reform in many countries. In particular, rising for-
eign interest rates stimulated the demands of
domestic investors for higher returns on financial
assets and intensified pressures for reductions in
exchange and capital controls.
Given the shortcomings of the existing financial
regulatory framework in most Pacific Basin coun-
tries, policymakers sought to lessen the govern-
ment's role in directing resource allocation and to
permit market forces to reduce distortions and
inefficiencies. As a result, almost all countries
have relaxed interest rate controls on bank de-
posits, lowered bank reserve requirements and
liquidity ratios, eliminated rules concerning the
allocation of credit, stopped providing special
credit at preferential rates, and reduced
exchange controls. In many instances the author-
ities have also sought to encourage the
development of new financial instruments with
open-market determined interest rates.
Monetary policy
The changes in the structure of financial markets
have changed the conduct of monetary policy in
all these countries in the last 15 years. While the
extent and specifics of these changes have varied
across countries, their direction generally has
been toward market-oriented conduct of mone-
tary policy.
In the countries with already highly developed fi-
nancial markets, the conduct of monetary policy
has changed relatively little. For example, in the
United States, the Federal Reserve has continued
to rely on the market mechanism in conducting
monetary policy, using open-market operations
to affect the level of bank reserves. The deregula-
tionotcleposit rates sincethe late 1970s has
induced only modest changes in the way policy
is conducted. Likewise, the only significant pol-
icy shift in Hong Kong occurred in 1983, when it
changed from floating to fixed exchange rates. In
Singapore, the shift from direct controls to a
market-oriented monetary policy occurred early,
and was largely accomplished by 1975.
The greatest shifts in monetary policy regimes
have occurred among the countries in the Pacific
Basin where financial systems have undergone
relatively greater transformation. For example, in
the early 1980s Australia and New Zealand abol-
ished interest rate controls, floated their
exchange rates, and completely discarded the
use of administrative directives for the conduct of
monetary policy. Both central banks shifted to
extensive use of open-market operations for
adjusting the level of bank reserves. The develop-
ment of monetary markets operating outside the
regulated banking sector has facilitated the cen-
tral banks' open-market operations.
Indonesia, in a dramatic leap, cast off all its
direct controls in both the domestic financial
markets and the foreign exchange market and
floated its exchange rate. In addition, it has assid-
uously nurtured the growth of domestic money
markets by issuing large volumes of central bank
certificates and establishing institutions to ensure
the liquidity ofthe new instruments in secondary
markets. As a result, domestic money markets
have developed sufficiently for the central bank
to engage in open-market operations in domestic
securities in order to supplement operations in
the foreign exchange market.
The changes in Japan's monetary policy regime
have been more modest. The pressing need to
finance large government deficits, which grew
fivefold in the late 1970s, forced Japan to dis-
mantle interest rate controls and to permit new
financial instruments and markets to arise,
although the pace has been gradual. It has alsoMonetary authorities now have greater indepen-
dencefromfiscal authorities because financial
liberalization has spurred the development of
money and capital markets, thereby enabling
central banks to pursue open market operations
more actively. As a result, central banks are rely-
ing less on discount policy, reserve requirements,
and direct control of credit.
The new financial environment has posed chal-
lenges to central bankers, and they have re-
sponded with major changes in the way they
conduct monetary policy. It is too early to evalu-
ate the relative success of each nation's particular
policies, but it is clear that the departure from
the past has led to greater economic efficiency in
these nations.
in Asia-Pacific nations over the last 15 years have
been both a response to the rapidly changing
economic and market environment ofthe 1970s
and 1980s and a reflection of fundamental revi-
sions in the regulatory thinking of national
authorities. While the extent of change has varied
from country to country, the way monetary policy
is conducted in the region now is fundamentally
different from the way it was conducted in the
mid-1970s.
Moreover, the development and deepening of do-
mestic financial markets, together with the
growth of international financial markets have in-
creased the mobility of international capital, and
as a consequence, have tied domestic interest
rates more closely to world interest rates. In this
new environment, individual countries have had
to revise exchange rate regimes and policies that








Finally, monetary policy in China is changing
dramatically, as the nation moves away from a
rigid, planned economy to one that is more mar-
ket oriented. In the process of reforming the
economy, a central bank has emerged, and state-
owned banks have been allowed to engage in
deposit taking and business financing under the
central bank's close administrative controls. A
rudimentary interbank money market has
emerged, but there is no significant open money
market yet. Although the country is still in an
early stage of developing a market-oriented
banking system, monetary policy in China is as-
suming an important role in macroeconomic
stabilization for the first time.
Korea and Taiwan have tried to develop their
financial systems by creating money markets out-
side the banking sector, and in the process have
also partially liberalized their exchange controls
while simultaneously attempting to peg their ex-
change rates. Monetary policy in both countries
is still conducted primarily through direct
controls on state-owned banks,· althoughinterest
rates are now adjusted more frequently in re-
sponse to changes in market conditions.
Conclusions
The changes in the conduct of monetary policy
Thailand also has not changed its way of
conducting monetary policy very much. The
central bank's attempt to stabilize both the ex-
change rate and domestic interest rates in the
face of widely fluctuating world interest rates has
exacerbated money instability, however. More
recent policy changes suggest a move toward
greater exchange rate stability and more domes-
tic interest rate flexibility.
gradually removed capital controls. Floating ex-
change rates have enabled the Bank ofJapan to
retain some indirect control of domestic interest
rates.
Interested readers may obtain copies of the book, Monetary Policy in Pacific Basin Countries,
edited by Hang-Sheng Cheng, by ordering directly from the publisher:
Kluwer Academic Publishers
P.O. Box 358, Accord Station
Hingham, MA 02018-9990
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